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Abstract—This paper discusses the problem of securing the
transmissions of multiple ground users against eavesdropping
attacks. We propose and optimize the deployment of a single
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which serves as an aerial relay
between the user cluster and the base station. The focus is on
maximizing the secrecy energy efficiency by jointly optimizing
the uplink transmission powers of the ground users and the
position of the UAV. The joint optimization problem is nonconvex;
therefore we split it into two subproblems and solve them using
an iterative algorithm.
Index Words–Cellular communications, 5G, secrecy rate, secu-
rity, UAS, UAV.
I. INTRODUCTION
The worldwide deployment of 4G long-term evolution
(LTE) and now 5G New Radio (NR) networks and the in-
creasing number of vertical industries those networks support,
requires secure and reliable communications. Unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) will be fully integrated into cellular networks
and will be able to assist 5G and beyond networks [1] [2].
UAVs come in many forms. They have flexible mobility
patterns, can hover, be tethered, and can often establish strong
line of sight (LoS) connectivity with ground users at low
deployment costs. An emerging application for UAVs is the
use of rapidly deployable aerial support nodes that can enhance
the security of terrestrial or aerial wireless networks [3].
This paper focuses on the security of the cellular radio
access network (RAN) and, in particular, the privacy of
broadband transmissions. We analyze the feasibility of using
a single UAV to improve the security of several ground
cellular network users against eavesdropping. Eavesdropping
is a fundamental attack, where the eavesdropper in this case
is a radio receiver that illegitimately captures information
transmitted over the air. This attack can compromise the
privacy of sensitive data, missions, or systems. It can also
facilitate effective follow-up attacks on the data integrity or
service availability, among others.
A number of existing works have studied the use of UAVs as
support nodes for improving the physical layer security. This
includes securing a single UAV-to-ground transmission against
static ground eavesdropping attacks by optimizing the UAV
trajectory and transmission power of the UAV [4]. The authors
of [5] propose a similar technique to enhance the secrecy
rate of UAV-to-ground communications under a single static
eavesdropping attack at a known location. The work presented
in [6] proposed to secure the downlink transmission from an
aerial base station (BS) to multiple fixed ground users in a
time division multiple access (TDMA) manner while another
UAV is jamming the signals. It employs a joint optimization
Fig. 1: Multiuser eavesdropping scenario.
of user scheduling, UAV trajectory and transmission power.
Similarly, the authors of [7] design an optimization problem
for the same environment, but for a frequency division multiple
access(FDMA) scheme.
Most of these prior works have studied the problem of
securing the wireless networks while using the UAV as an
aerial relay for a single static user. Reference [7] proposes a
solution for a multiuser scenario, but the users are still static.
To the best of our knowledge there is a research gap in ana-
lyzing the scalability performance of an UAV relay supporting
multiple mobile ground users against multiple eavesdroppers.
Therefore, we investigate the performance of a UAV relay as
a mitigation technique against eavesdropping attacks targeting
a cluster of mobile ground users. More precisely, this paper
proposes a joint UAV positioning and multiuser power control
scheme to maximize the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) for
efficient and secure multiuser broadband communications.
We first present the system model, problem formulation and
our iterative solution. Numerical results are provided in III.
Section IV derives the conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 illustrates the scenario considered in this work. A
cluster of mobile ground users communicates with a base
station in the presence of eavesdroppers. The active users in the
cluster are distributed randomly within the radius of the cluster.
The UAV relay can position itself to support the user under
attack and relay the data streams. Without loss of generality,
in this paper we model and analyze the uplink transmission.
The same principles can be applied for the downlink.
For notational convenience, the set of M users in the cluster
and the set of K eavesdroppers are denoted as V = {Vi|i =
1, 2, ...,M} and E = {Ej |j = 1, 2, ...K}, respectively. We
define the location of the UAV relay, the eavesdropper, and the
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2ith user in the 3D Cartesian coordinate system as (xu, yu, H) ,
(xj , yj , zj), and (xi, yi, zi), respectively. The UAV flies at the
altitude H , which may be chosen according to the minimum
height at which the UAV will have line of sight (LoS) links
with the users in the cluster [8].
For practicality, we distribute the UAV relaying period over
N time slots. Therefore, the UAV coordinates in time slot n
will be expressed as (xu[n], yu[n], H[n]).
A. Communications Channel
The received signal at the UAV when ground user Vi
transmits signal si with power Pi is defined as
ru =
√
Pigiusi + ni, (1)
where giu is the air-to-ground (A2G) channel power gain
between user Vi and the UAV, and ni denotes the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) of zero mean and σ2 variance.
A limited cluster size and flexible height of the UAV allows
us to assume that the channel between ground users and UAV
will be dominantly LoS. Therefore, the channel gain in time
slot n is characterized by a path loss exponent of 2 and can
be written as
giu[n] = β0d
−2
iu [n]
=
β0
(xi[n]− xu[n])2 + (yi[n]− yu[n])2 + (zi[n]−H)2 ,
(2)
where B0 is the channel gain at the reference point of d0 =
1 m and diu[n] is the distance between the ith user and the
UAV in the nth time slot.
The capacity of the channel between user Vi and the UAV
in time slot n is given as
Ciu[n] = log2
(
1 +
Pi[n]giu[n]
σ2
)
= log2
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d2iu[n]
)
,
(3)
where λ0 = β0/σ2 is the SNR at the reference point.
B. Wiretap Channel
The received signal overheard by the eavesdropper Ej can
be formulated as
rj =
√
Piwijsi + nj , (4)
where nj denotes the AWGN at the eavesdropper Ej . The
ground-to-ground (G2G) channel gain between the user Vi and
eavesdropper Ej in time slot n is correspondingly modeled as
wij [n] = β0d
−4
ij [n]
=
β0
((xi[n]− xj [n])2 + (yi[n]− yj [n])2 + (zi[n]− zj [n])2)2
,
(5)
where dij [n] is the distance between the ith user and the jth
eavesdropper in the nth time slot. The path loss exponent
between ground users and ground eavesdroppers is assumed
to be 4 here.
The capacity of the wiretap channel between user Vi and
eavesdropper Ej at time n is then
Cij [n] = log2
(
1 +
Pi[n]wij [n]
σ2
)
= log2
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d4ij [n]
)
)
.
(6)
This work considers the case of uncoordinated eavesdrop-
ping attacks. As a result, the capacity of the eavesdropping
channel is calculated as the maximum capacity among the K
eavesdroppers:
Cij [n] = max
j∈E
Cij [n] = max
j∈E
log2
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d4ij [n]
)
. (7)
C. Secrecy Capacity Metric
A common metric to evaluate the influence of eavesdropping
and the performance of mitigation techniques is the secrecy
capacity. The secrecy capacity is calculated as the difference
between the legitimate and the wiretap channel capacities and
corresponds to the rate at which no data will be decoded by
the eavesdropper [9]. The secrecy capacity of all users under
attack is then obtained as
CTotalsec =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
M∑
i=1
Ciu −max
j∈E
Cij [n]
)
. (8)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The objective of this paper is maximizing the average
secrecy rate CTotalsec by optimizing the UAV relay position and
transmission power.
The UAV position is a function of the radius of the mobile
cluster R. In order to have a short distance to the effected users
with strong LoS connections, the UAV position constraint is
formulated as follows:√
(xu[n]− xcenter[n])2 + (yu[n]− ycenter[n])2 ≤ R,∀n,
(9)
where xcenter[n] and ycenter[n] are the center coordinates of
the mobile cluster at time slot n. We introduce the average
transmission power P¯ and the peak transmission power Pmax,
where P¯ ≤ Pmax. The user transmission power constraint is
1
N
N∑
n=1
P [n] ≤ P¯ , (10)
0 ≤ P [n] ≤ Pmax,∀n. (11)
The optimization problem can now be written as
(P1) : max
xu,yu,P
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
M∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d2iu[n]
)
−max
j∈E
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d4ij [n]
)]+
,
s.t. (9), (10), (11),
(12)
where [x]+ , max(x, 0).
IV. ITERATIVE SOLUTION
The objective function is non-convex with respect the op-
timization parameters xu, yu, and P . In addition, the [.]+
operator creates a non-smooth objective function. As a result,
we propose an iterative approach for solving it.
3Problem P1 can be reformulated as a new optimization
problem P2 with the same optimal solution.
(P2) : max
xu,yu,P
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
M∑
i=1
log2
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d2iu[n]
)
−max
j∈E
log2
(
1 +
λ0Pi[n]
d4ij [n]
)]
,
s.t. (9), (10), (11).
(13)
P2 still holds the restriction that the capacity of the legitimate
user in each time slot must be higher than the capacity
achieved at the eavesdropper similar to P1; otherwise, P [n]
is set to zero. The transformation from P1 to P2 eliminates
the non-smoothness, but P2 is still non-convex.
We therefore propose an iterative algorithm for solving
P2. It is derived from the block coordinate descent strategy.
In particular, we split the problem into two subproblems by
separating the optimization variables in two blocks. The first
subproblem optimizes the transmission powers with respect to
a given UAV position. The second subproblem aims at finding
the optimal UAV position for the given transmission powers.
The solution of each subproblem will be applied to the other
subproblem, iteratively until convergence.
A. Sub-problem P2.I: Transmission Power Optimization
We apply log2(z) = ln(z)/ ln(2) to define the optimization
subproblem P2.I as
(P2.I) : max
P
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
M∑
i=1
ln (1 + µnPi[n])
−max
j∈E
ln (1 + ηnPi[n])
]
,
s.t. (10), (11),
(14)
where
µn =
λ0
(xi[n]− xu[n])2 + (yi[n]− yu[n])2 + (zi[n]−H)
(15)
and
ηn =
λ0
(xi[n]− xj [n])2 + (yi[n]− yj [n])2 + (zi[n]− zj [n])2 .
(16)
Based on the findings of [10], the optimal solution for (14)
can be obtained as
P˜ [n] =
{
min ([P ◦[n]]+, Pmax) µn ≥ ηn,
0 µn ≤ ηn,
(17)
where
P ◦[n] =
√(
1
2ηn
− 1
2µn
)2
+
1
ρ
(
1
ηn
− 1
µn
)
− 1
2ηn
− 1
2µn
.
(18)
The constant ρ has been introduced to limit the peak power
according to (10).
B. Sub-problem P2.II: UAV Position Optimization
The second subproblem of P2 optimizes the UAV position
and can be formulated as
(P2.II) : max
xu,yu
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
M∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P`i
d2iu[n]
)
−max
j∈E
ln
(
1 +
P`i
d4ij [n]
)]
,
s.t. (9),
(19)
where P`i = λ0Pi[n]. Here we optimize only the aerial relay
position. Hence, the focus is on the Ciu term of P2.II ,
to maximize the capacity between the ground users and the
UAV. In order to solve this sub-problem that is a non-concave
function with respect to xu and yu, we add a slack variable
ψ = [ψ[1], · · · , ψ[N ]†. The optimization problem can then be
reformulated as
(P2.II) : max
xu,yu,ψ
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
M∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P`i
ψ[n]
)]
, (20.a)
s.t.
ψ[n]− x2i [n] + 2xi[n]xu[n]− x2u[n]− y2i [n] + 2yi[n]yu[n]
− y2u[n]− z2i [n] + 2zi[n]H −H2 ≤ 0,∀n,
(20.b)
ψ[n] ≥ 0,∀n. (20.c)
The equality in (20.b) and (20.c) shall be satisfied for the
optimum solution. If this is not the case, then the slack variable
ψ[n] can be increased until an improvement in the objective
function is achieved. As a result, we can consider that the ideal
result of problem (20.a) will be the same for (19).
In the process of finding the optimal solution for (20.a),
we must consider the terms −x2u[n] and −y2u[n] that con-
ceive the non-convexity. Therefore, an approximate solu-
tion can be found for (20.a) by defining the initial points
xu(fea) , [xu(fea)[1], · · · , xu(fea)[N ]]† and yu(fea) ,
[yu(fea)[1], · · · , yu(fea)[N ]]†. By taking into consideration
that −x2u[n] and −y2u[n] are concave functions, their first-order
Taylor expansions at xu(fea)[n] and yu(fea)[n] are global over-
estimators:
− x2u[n] ≤ x2u(fea)[n]− 2xu(fea)[n]xu[n], (21)
− y2u[n] ≤ y2u(fea)[n]− 2yu(fea)[n]yu[n]. (22)
As a result, (20.a) and its constraint (20.b) can be reformu-
lated as
(P2.II) : max
xu,yu,ψ
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
M∑
i=1
ln
(
1 +
P`i
ψ[n]
)]
, (23.a)
s.t.
ψ[n]− x2i [n] + 2xi[n]xu[n] + x2u(fea)[n]− 2xu(fea)[n]xu[n]
− y2i [n] + 2yi[n]yu[n] + y2u(fea)[n]− 2yu(fea)[n]yu[n]
− z2i [n] + 2zi[n]H −H2 ≤ 0,∀n.
(23.b)
ψ[n] ≥ 0,∀n. (23.c)
4Fig. 2: SSE for multiple mobile UEs under attack by multiple eavesdroppers and different mitigation strategies.
This final version of the UAV position optimization problem
is concave with a convex feasibility region. Therefore, the
solution for it can be obtained by using the interior point
method [11].
Since the first constraint of problem (23) covers that of
problem (20), the feasible solutions to (20) can be found by
solving (23). In addition, it is guaranteed that applying the
solution of (23) to the objective function of (20) will not result
in a lower value when using initial points (xu(fea), yu(fea)).
This is so because these points provide the lower bound for
(20). However, by finding a solution to (23), the lower bound
of (20) will be maximized.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Numerical results are provided to evaluate the performance
of the proposed technique. Without loss of generality, the user
cluster contains one, two or four single-antenna UEs with
a random distribution positions within a given radius. The
simulation scenario contains two fixed eavesdroppers that are
able to choose the closet UEs within the cluster to wiretap
their uplink transmissions. The eavesdroppers thus attack the
most vulnerable users. This maximizes the wiretapping rates
at the eavesdroppers.
A UAV relay is equipped with an omidirectional antenna
and for a given location of the user cluster calculates its
position as a function of the determined UE transmission
powers in an iterative optimization process, applying the
proposed algorithms in Section IV.
In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme,
we consider two baseline UAV positioning mechanisms for
relaying the uplink data: The leading UAV moves at a higher
velocity than the ground user cluster. The lagging UAV travels
at a lower velocity than the ground users. Both these baseline
techniques are implemented without power control, and the
transmission powers are equally distributed in each time slot
as P [n] = P¯ ,∀n. Table I provides the simulation parameters.
TABLE I: Simulation parameters.
Simulation parameter Value
Cluster initial center position (10,0,1.5)
Cluster radius 30 m
1st eavesdropper position (140, 0, 1.5)
2nd eavesdropper position (300, 0, 1.5)
UAV relay initial position (10, 0, 80)
Leading & lagging transmit powers 1 W
Leading & lagging factor 2 & 0.5
Fig. 2 illustrates the SEE at the different locations along
the traveled path for different schemes with different number
of served users. The results show the three cases where the
eavesdroppers attack a cluster of one, two, or four mobile UEs.
The curves show that the SEE performances when applying
the proposed joint optimization are nearly identical for a
single, two, or four UEs that are served by the aerial relay.
Overall, the proposed technique shows outstanding perfor-
mance in terms of SEE when compared to no relaying and
superior performance when compared to suboptimal aerial
relay positioning and power control parameters. Additional
simulations with more UEs in the cluster show similar results.
This verifies the scalability of the UAV-relay assisted technique
as an effective mitigation strategy against eavesdropping.
Fig. 3 shows the convergence behavior of the iterative
algorithm for four UEs under attack and two UAV heights.
The corresponding curves for two UEs in the cluster are nearly
identical and are therefore omitted. The initial SEE is nearly
6 bps/Hz/W and after 130 iterations, the algorithm converges at
10 and 8 bps/Hz/W for 80 and 160 m UAV height, respectively.
Fig. 4 presents the SEE performance as a function of the
maximum uplink transmission power Pmax for three UAV
heights. We chose a range that represents low-power IoT
5Fig. 3: Trajectory optimization convergence for four UEs and
two UAV heights.
Fig. 4: SSE for two UEs as a function of the maximum
transmission power and UAV height.
devices to higher power public safety UEs. Both results—
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5—show that the SEE rapidly increases and
reaches a steady state at about 400 mW. Note that the SEE
performances for 200 mW, which legacy 4G phones use, and
400 mW differ only by 0.25-0.5 bps/Hz/W. The reason behind
the monotonic behavior is that the SEE is a non-decreasing
function of the maximum transmission power. Therefore,
carefully regulating the transmission power is needed for an
efficient communication and attack mitigation.
The obtained results from Fig. 2, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show
that combining the optimization of the transmission powers of
ground users and the UAV position can significantly improve
(1) the UE power efficiency and (2) the SEE by almost 17%
in the tight attack zone between the two eavesdroppers and by
over 30% when the cluster travels away from the attack zone.
Note that the leading and lagging UAVs transmit at 1 W so
that the SEE differences in Fig. 2 are observed due to the UAV
position.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
UAV based aerial relays have been proposed as a mitigation
technique against eavesdropping because of their the high
mobility and manoeuvrability in the 3D space, dominant LoS
links with ground nodes, and their low cost. Research has
considered application, but the scalability of a UAV to support
multiple mobile users has not been considered and is important
Fig. 5: SSE for four UEs as a function of the maximum
transmission power and UAV height.
for practical deployment reasons. This paper has therefore
studied this aspect and proposed and solved an optimization
problem that optimizes UE transmission power and UAV
positioning. The obtained results and key findings show that
the use of UAVs as aerial relays is an efficient and scalable
mitigation scheme against distributed eavesdroppers whose
location is unknown. We will consider the relation of radius,
number of UEs and UAVs on optimal aerial relay deployments
and validate the proposed techniques on suitable research
platforms, such as the Aerial Experimentation and Research
Platform for Advanced Wireless (AERPAW) [12].
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